We, the undersigned citizens of the United States of America and concerned individuals from around the world, believe the use of "paperless" all-electronic voting machines is a dangerous addition to the U.S. electoral system.

These machines, which produce no hard-copy paper records of votes cast, give elections officials no way of recovering votes in the event of hardware failure. There is no secondary option for re-counting votes in the event of a challenged election. They provide no possibility for voters or elections officials to verify that the votes recorded match the intended choices of the voter.

Such voting machines were proven to suffer disasterous malfunctions in the November 2004 election, losing votes in some cases, recording thousands of false votes in others, and sometimes registering votes for incorrect candidates despite voters' repeated attempts to select their preferred candidate. Discrepancies between exit-polling data and final vote counts in all-electronic voting areas have caused a grave level of doubt and lost confidence in the validity of the U.S. electoral system.

None of these errors would be a hindrance to fair and accurate elections, if the machines produced a paper-record printout of each individuals' votes for the voter to review and deposit in a secured ballot box. In the event of lost votes, the paper ballots provide a reliable backup for a hand recount. In the event of false over-votes, the paper records could be compared against the computer databases. All voters could verify the accuracy of their own ballots, and the existence of a paper record for all votes cast would renew confidence in the accuracy and validity of electoral results.

We believe the right of every registered voter to have their vote accurately and verifiably cast in every election is one of the most fundamental rights of American citizenship. We also believe that the level of trust held by American and other nations' citizens in the validity of our electoral system is crucial for the domestic stability of the U.S. government, and in maintaining the respect and diplomatic support of the international community.

In the interests of protecting this critical element of our electoral system, we propose legislation mandating the following:

1. Electronic voting machines must produce a paper record of every ballot cast, which will serve as the official ballot in any recount or audit.

2. The paper records must be printed at the time the ballot is cast, in the privacy of the voting booth, so the voter may confidentially review the printout.

3. All polling places using such machines must provide a locked ballot box in which to collect the paper records, after they are reviewed and approved by the voter.

4. A random recount of 5% of the paper ballots must be conducted in every county using any computerized counting equipment to verify the accuracy of the machine count. If the recount shows a discrepancy of more than two votes in any precinct, or an error of one vote in two or more precincts, a full manual recount of the county will be conducted.

5. Election officials must keep all paper ballots secure until such time as any necessary recount is completed and/or the final election results are certified.